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Daniel Gros 
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Muddling through isn’t working. This commentary argues that troubled eurozone nations should 
simultaneously open restructuring talks while continuing to service their debts normally. Germany, 
France and other core eurozone nations would have to stand ready to recapitalise the banks most 
exposed to the restructured debt. The ECB would then stabilise the banking system and the EFSF 
would stabilise sovereign debt. This big bang could be prepared in a weekend; the market already 
seems to be pricing it in. 
very much hope that everything I write in this column turns out to be irrelevant and that it will 
not be necessary to resort to such drastic action. Economic logic suggests, however, that it 
might soon represent the least-bad solution to a crisis that keeps getting worse. That said… 
The horses have left the stable. Europe’s leaders have announced officially that there might be 
sovereign defaults in the eurozone. But now there are no good options left. Governments want 
markets to believe that defaults will happen only after 2013, but what investor is going to wait 
patiently to be fleeced in a couple of years hence? The buyers’ strike of peripheral eurozone debt is 
thus likely to continue, thus raising the cost of the future rescue operations, which are clearly on the 
horizon. The cost of muddling through is increasing by the day. 
It would, of course, also be a mistake to let policy be dictated by short-term gyrations in the bond 
markets. But one recent development has increased the urgency of acting soon.  This is the 
announcement of the Eurogroup on November 28
th that the loans of the future European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) would be senior to private creditors.
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1 Moreover it appears that the loans extended to Greece and Ireland in the context of the existing 
programmes would ex post be transformed into ESM programme loans and would thus also become senior. 
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As I argue at length in a companion comment,
2 this implies that large bailout programmes might 
actually lead to higher risk premiums because large official bailout programmes would imply that 
any eventual restructuring losses will be shifted to long-term creditors; short-term creditors will 
have already been paid off in full. 
Moreover, the punitive interest rate (5.8%) imposed on Ireland now by the EFSF implies that a 
large official loan actually makes default more likely because the growth rate that one can now 
expect for the next years (1-2%) is clearly below the interest rate. When the numerator (debt 
service) rises faster than the denominator (GDP, i.e. ability to pay), a snowball effect occurs 
whereby it is ever more difficult for the country to service its debt (which in the case of Ireland 
would amount to 75% of GNP; see Eichengreen, 2010).  
The problem: Vicious circles 
This creates the risk of a vicious circle under which a country that has only a manageable problem 
might be forced into an EFSF (ESM) programme, which would then make debt service more 
onerous because of the punitive interest rates. This is likely to induce investors to sell the longer-
term debt of the country, which would in turn increase the pressure on the country to accept an 
EFSF programme. The larger the programme, the less would be available in the end for 
bondholders should the programme not work. This is likely to lead to a further increase in the risk 
premium. The present strategy of muddling through on a case-by-case basis, but insisting that the 
future mechanism will be senior to private creditors (and that the latter must expect losses), thus 
carries a strong risk that more and more countries will be forced into a deadly spiral of increasing 
risk premiums and ever-increasing financing needs. 
The solution 
The only way out seems to be a big bang: to deal with all the problem cases in one go. The 
argument against a restructuring of, say, Greek public debt has always been that this would lead to 
contagion. But contagion is already a fact of life, and it gravitates towards countries with real 
problems. Portugal, with its combination of high external debt and poor growth prospects, looks 
like Greece. Spain has the ‘Irish disease’: a real estate bust that leads to huge losses in the banking 
system. Every country is different, and some countries (Spain, for example) would under normal 
circumstances not need a bail out. But these are not normal circumstance, and it is not possible to 
deal with each country in sequence because each bailout leads the markets to expect the next one. 
Only a big bang can resolve the impasse. 
How should this big bang look like? A sudden collective default would of course constitute a ‘mega 
Lehman’ and would have catastrophic consequences. However, it is entirely possible for the 
countries in question to make investors an exchange offer while continuing to service their payment 
obligations. There should thus be no technical default, but simply an offer to bondholders to engage 
in discussions about debt restructuring accompanied by a concrete exchange offer. 
Everybody is different 
All countries should thus move at the same time, but each country has its own set of problems, and 
would make a different offer to creditors. Greece and Spain illustrate the two polar cases. 
In the Greek case, the problem is clearly the sovereign. Holders of Greek public debt could be 
offered a par bond (100% of the nominal, but with a low interest rate and a long maturity). This 
would ensure that banks (and the ECB) would not have to immediately book huge losses on their 
accounts. 
                                                            
2 See Daniel Gros (2010), “The Seniority Conundrum: Bail out countries but bail in private, short-term 
creditors?”, CEPS Commentary, 6 December. All together now? Arguments for a big-bang solution to eurozone problems | 3 
In addition to the par bond, creditors would be offered GDP warrants under which the government 
of Greece would offer to allocate a certain percentage of any increment in nominal GDP (after the 
trough expected for 2010/11) to additional payments to foreign creditors, pro rata their present 
holdings.
3 If Greece were to pay foreign creditors about 4-5% of any increment in nominal GDP, 
substantial payments could built up over time, with full (even if late) payment possible if Greece 
returns to a decent growth path. The annex provides some crude model calculations to this effect. 
For Portugal, a simple rescheduling might be sufficient. 
In the Spanish case, the problem stems from the banks. Nobody can know with certainty how large 
their losses will be in the end. But this uncertainty drags down the entire country. The banks must 
thus be sacrificed if the sovereign wants to stay afloat. Holders of bonds of the banks most exposed 
to the real estate bust would thus be offered a debt for equity swap. The Spanish government would 
then be free of further large contingent liabilities, and should have no problems servicing its present 
debt of around 60% of GDP. 
The accounting losses for the holders of Spanish bank bonds might again be limited if the bonds are 
transformed into subordinated debt with the same face value of the bonds. For holders of the bonds 
that do not mark to market, the accounting losses could then be taken over a longer period. Spanish 
banks would not be forced into fire sales, and patient investors might limit their losses if the 
Spanish real-estate sector does recover. 
The same should have been done in Ireland. But at this point it would require first the (new) Irish 
government to renege on the guarantee given by the old government. This will lead to legal 
problems and would formally be equivalent to a default, but it would restore the solvency of the 
Irish government, so that no haircut would be needed on Irish government debt. The debt-for-equity 
swap (as with GDP warrants) allows investors to participate in the upside that would materialise if 
the assets of the Irish banks and Spanish cajas are really worth as much as the banks and their 
regulators maintain. 
Core governments would of course have to stand ready to recapitalise their banks that have the 
highest exposure to the peripheral debt to be restructured. 
Quick preparation 
All this could be prepared during a special weekend meeting of the European Council (followed by 
a Eurogroup and probably also an EcoFin meeting). 
What about the day after? Although this package should restore the solvency of those governments 
currently under market pressure, there might still be initially turmoil in the markets. However, at 
this point the ECB would be justified in providing abundant liquidity to the interbank market which 
should then be free of "zombies". Governments and the ECB would thus agree on a division of a 
labour: 
•  The ECB stabilises the banking system, and 
•  The EFSF/ESM (the fiscal authorities) take care of the financing needs of governments. 
                                                            
3 The case of Iceland provides a recent precedent for GDP-linked payments. In this case the governments of 
England and the Netherlands agreed that Iceland should have paid (at most) 6% of any increment in GDP. 
However, this deal was not approved in a referendum. Argentina constitutes another precedent, but this case 
might be rather an example of how to mis-use this concept in the sense that the GDP warrants were not 
intended to give the investors the potential to recoup their investment fully even in case the Argentine 
economy recovered fully. This idea to link payments to capacity to service debt, called Besserungschein in 
German, is widely used in private transactions. Robert Schiller has called for GDP-related financial 
instruments which would allow borrowers and investors to hedge against shocks to growth. See also 
Borensztein & Mauro (2002). 4 | Daniel Gros 
The funding of the EFSF should then be sufficient to cover the (reduced) financing needs of all four 
GIPS (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) countries for quite some time. 
Patient execution 
The big-bang approach is not without risk. It could be prepared in a weekend, but it would require 
months of patient negotiations to get bondholders to agree. 
Such an agreement is actually very likely to happen because the offer would be close to current 
market prices and because a large part – maybe even a majority – of the bonds are in the hands of 
institutions that should respond to political pressures to accept the deal. 
Could a ‘hold out’ by a minority of bondholders who refuse to accept a deal create endless legal 
problems? There is a solution to this problem suggested by Buchheit & Guti (2010). Greece and 
other countries could just pass a ‘mopping up’ law which stipulates that any agreement by a super-
majority of bondholders (say two-thirds) is binding on the remainder.  This would create 
immediately a statuary ‘collective-action clause’. The absence of such clauses thus does not 
constitute an insurmountable obstacle to reaching an agreement with creditors, as argued recently 
also by Nouriel Roubini (2010) in the Financial Times. 
Conclusions 
Muddling through is more attractive in the short run, but it does not lead anywhere when doubts 
about debt sustainability persist and the market has been destabilised by the announcement that the 
loans of the new permanent crisis mechanism would be senior to private creditors.  
Restructuring will become virtually impossible once the Greek and Irish programmes have run their 
course. At the end of these programmes, the major part of the debt of these countries will be owed 
towards creditors which regard themselves as senior (IMF and ESM), but still impose interest rates 
far above growth rates.  
At that point, the haircut for the remaining private creditors would have to be enormous should the 
debt sustainability assessment announced by the Eurogroup come to a negative result. Even a low 
probability of such a result can destabilise markets today, thereby making procrastination 
expensive. 
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Technical Appendix: What value in GDP warrants? 
Simple model calculations show that the value of the GDP bonds (or warrants) could be quite 
substantial. For a much more detailed approach, see Miyamajima (2006). 
The basic mechanism would be quite simple: each year Greece would dedicate a certain percentage, 
called τ, of the increment in GDP over the basis year (2010) to foreign debt service (as no interest 
would be payable on the discount bonds). This percentage might be fixed at 4% (in the case of 
Iceland the cap was set at 6%). Given that government revenues amount to about 40% of GDP this 
implies that about 10% of the higher government revenues generated automatically by GDP growth 
would have to be diverted to foreign creditors. 
The annual payments would then be given by τ (Yt - Y0). 
If  nominal GDP grows with a constant rate, g, (and starting from 2010 GDP level of Y0) the 
payments (on the GDP bonds only) would evolve over time following: τ (Y0(1+g)
t - Y0) = τY0 ( 
(1+g)
t - 1). 
Discounting these flows over time at the interest rate i yields the present value of future payments: 
Present value of annual payment (until infinity) = Σt { τY0 [ (1+g)
t – 1]/(1+i)
t}. 
This reduces to: Present value = τY0 (1+i)[ 1/(i-g) – 1/i]. 
If Greece were to dedicate 4% of the growth in nominal GDP to foreign creditors and the ‘market’ 
interest rate is 10%, the present value (as a ratio of starting GDP) would be given by: 0.04* (1.1)[ 
1/(0.1-g) – 10].  
For a nominal growth rate of 5% (g =0.05), this would amount to 44% of GDP, enough to make up 
for a haircut of over 30% on the entire stock of Greek debt (now close to 130% of GDP). 